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Climate Policies Deserve a Negative Discount Rate
Marc Fleurbaey* and Stephane Zuber t

Abstract
EricA. Posnerand David Weisbach' advocate discounting thefuture impacts of climate
policies at the market rate of return in order to take account of opportunity costs; however, ihey
suggest that the desirable amount of investment may have to be decided on ethicalgrounds.2 We
argue that deriving the discount ratefrom a social welfare objective is preferable to the market
rate because it both accounts for opportunity costs and suitaby determines the amount of
investment in climate policies that is desirable for future generations. Moreover, extending
Martin WeitZman'? and Christian Gollier' results on discounting under uncertainty, we
show thatfor evaluating the long-run impacts of climate poliies, a negative discount rate may
bejustfied. This is due to the uncertainty offuture growth and the fact that suchpolicies have
greaterreturns in bad climate scenarios. The distributive impact of such policies alsojustifies a
low discount rate if the poorestpopulations are the most vulnerable to climate change. Finally,
we argue in favor of going beyond classical utilitarian calculus in order to better incorporate
prioritiZationof the worst off into the evaluation of climatepolicies.
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Robert E. Kuenne Professor of Economics and Humanistic Studies at Princeton University.
Research Associate at Centre de Recherche Sens, Ethique, Societ6 (CERSES)-Universite Paris
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comments by Geir B. Asheim, David Weisbach (who in particular encouraged us to examine risky
returns to investment), the participants at the Conference on Climate Change Justice, and the
editors of this journal.
Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton 2010).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate policies are costly for the present generation, yet will benefit future
generations in centuries 'and millennia to come. It is incredibly hard to assess
whether the benefits outweigh the costs with such faraway horizons. Costbenefit analysis is generally used to assess the returns of public investments over
a decade or two, a relatively short horizon over which individual time
preferences and market rates provide useful guidelines. The discount rate is a
convenient tool that translates future values into their equivalent present value.
With a 3 percent rate, for instance, $1 million in ten years is worth about
$744,000 (=1,000,000/1.03') today.
For long-term, intergenerational tradeoffs, experts are hesitant to use the
same individual and market-rate time preferences because they imply
discounting future consumption flows at a rate that makes dramatic changes in
two generations look almost negligible in present value. Since the 2007
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publication of the Stern Review,s the discount rate has therefore been at the center
of heated discussions about climate policies.'
In the very long run, the discount rate makes a huge difference in the costbenefit evaluation of policies. Table 1 shows the minimum return that a $1
investment for the future must have in order to be considered better than
consuming $1 now, depending on the discount rate that is adopted and the
horizon. The 1.4 percent discount rate is advocated by the Stern Review,7 but later
Nicholas Stern suggested that 1.5 percent to 5 percent might be a better range.'
The table shows that this hesitation is not innocuous. Obviously, adopting a
much higher discount rate, as recommended by Nordhaus 9 -around 5.5
percent-has even more extreme consequences.o
TABLE

Time horizon
(years)

1.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT DISCOUNT RATES

Required return on $1 investment, by
discount rate ($)
Ratio

2.7%

1.4%

50

$2.00

$3.79

1.89

100

$4.02

$14.36

3.57

200

$16.13

$206.11

12.78

500

$1,044

$609,848

584

$1,091,327

$371,914,916,666

340,791

1000

Legend: With a 1.4 percent discount rate, a $1 investment today must yield at least
$4.02 in one hundredyears; nith a 2.7 percent discount rate, the numberjumps to
$14.36, which is 3.57 times greater.

5

Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Ckmate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge 2007).

6

See, for example, Richard Zeckhauser and W. Kip Viscusi, eds, Special Issue on Discounting Dilemmas,
37 J Risk & Uncertainty 95 (2008) (including contributions by economists Partha Dasgupta,
Christian Gollier, Paul A. Samuelson, and Lawrence Summers, among others).
Stem, The Stem Review at 184 (cited in note 5); see William D. Nordhaus, A Review of the Stem

7

9

Review on the Economics of Cimate Change, 45 J Econ Lit 686, 694 (2007).
Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Cmate Change, 98 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 17, 19
(2008). This is mostly about the value of parameter p (defined in Section II of this paper). This
parameter takes value 1 in the Stern Reiew whereas Stern later considered it could go up to 2. As
noted by Posner and Weisbach, if one inserts this upper value into the formula of the discount
rate that yields the 1.4 percent figure in the Stern Review, one obtains 2.7 percent instead. Posner
and Weisbach, Climate Change justice at 158 (cited in note 1).
Nordhaus, A Review ofthe Stern Review, 45 J Econ Lit at 686 (cited in note 7).

10

Id at 694.

8
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The thesis defended in this Article is that using a negative discount rate to
evaluate climate policies may be justified. This conclusion follows from two
important steps, each of which is an interesting separate thesis. First, different
policies should be evaluated with different discount rates, depending on which
populations are impacted. Second, in the long run, only the worst scenario for
the worst off fraction of the population counts.
Our thesis is at odds with Posner and Weisbach's conclusion in Chapter 7
of Climate Change Justice," even though we share the same premises: impartiality
between generations, compatibility with ethical principles, and taking
opportunity costs into account. Posner and Weisbach advocate using the market
interest rate as the discount rate for the selection of particular projects. It is an
interesting question to understand how our similar premises can deliver very
different practical conclusions. We disagree primarily on how to make use of the
discount rate. For us, it is a tool to assess and compare different consumption
paths or money flows in terms of net present value; for Posner and Weisbach, it
serves to take into account the opportunity cost of the investment.12
In Section II of this Article we introduce the basic methodology of
discounting. In Section III we examine the main objections to it that are
encountered in the debate about discounting, and discuss agreements and
disagreements with Posner and Weisbach about how to assess these arguments.
Then in Sections IV and V we extend the discounting methodology to
incorporate risk and intragenerational inequalities. As far as risk is concerned, we
offer a reformulation and extension of the well-known Weitzman-Gollier
arguments" in favor of using a small, possibly negative rate in the context of
risk. Section VI derives our core arguments for negative discount rates from the
results of Sections IV and V. For the sake of an easy presentation, the bulk of
the analysis is formulated in the context of utilitarian reasoning, but we explain
in Section VII why the utilitarian approach must be replaced with a more
promising approach and how this can affect the debate about the discount rate.
Section VIII concludes.
II. THE METHODOLOGY OF DISCOUNTING
In this section we present the basic methodology for calculating the
discount rate. As noted in the introduction, for simplicity we provisionally adopt

11

Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change fusie at 167-68 (cited in note 1).

12

Id at 147.
See generally Weitzman, 36 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 201 (cited in note 3); Gollier, 85 J Pub Econ
149 (cited in note 4).

13
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the utilitarian way of defining social welfare.' 4 As a consequence, what we
present in this section is essentially identical to the approach adopted in the Stern
Review. 15
More precisely, we assume that social welfare can be computed as the sum
of the utility of all individuals, giving the social welfare function
W = Lg U(cO),(1
where U(-) is the utility function and Ci is the consumption level of individual i.
What is important about this approach is that the function U(*) is assumed to be
the same for all individuals, which means in particular that there is no preference
for earlier generations relative to future generations because the contribution of
an individual's utility to total social welfare is unaffected by the time period in
which that individual lives. While the social welfare function W(-) embodies the
evaluator's neutrality about the distribution of utility among particular
individuals, the utility function U(-) captures the preferences of the evaluator
about inequalities in consumption-which means that, in terms of consumption,
the approach is prioritarian rather than utilitarian.16 We will sometimes adopt a
special functional form that is common in the economic literature: 17
U(c) =

1-p

(c'-P - ci-P),

(2)

where p can be interpreted as a coefficient of aversion to consumption
inequality,' and e is the minimum level of consumption that is required to make

14

For a very brief explanation of the utilitarian welfare function, see Stern, The Stern Review § 2.1 at
26-29 (cited in note 5).

'5

Stern, The Stern Review § 2A.2 at 52 (cited in note 5).
The utilitarian approach maximizes the sum whereas the prioritarian approach gives priority to
benefiting the badly off. Derek Parfit, Equaiy or Priority?, in Matthew Clayton and Andrew
Williams, eds, The Ideal of Equality 81, 81-125 (Macmillan 2000) (proposing a further distinction
between the prioritarian approach, which gives priority to the badly off and the egalitarian
approach, which gives priority to those who are worse off than others. But this distinction is not
important here).
See, for example, Stem, The Stern Review at 52 (cited in note 5); Nordhaus, 45 J Econ Lit at 691

16

17

(cited in note 7).

18

Stem, The Stern Review at 184 (cited in note 5), and Nordhaus, 45 J Econ Lit at 691 (cited in note
7) consider this parameter as an empirical magnitude that can be estimated from individual
attitudes to risk or to consumption smoothing over the life cycle. In the first sections of this
Article we only view it as embodying the social evaluator's attitude to inequalities in consumption.
Such an ethical attitude need not be related in any way to the population preferences about risk
and consumption. Risk preferences will be discussed in Section VII.

Winter 2013

569

ChicagoJoumal of InternationalLw

utility positive. With this function, the marginal utility of consumption, 1'(c), is
equal to C-P, which makes further analysis quite simple.
For the sake of simplicity, we ignore the risk that future generations will
not exist. This issue will be introduced later in the Article."
Suppose that ci is reduced by a small amount Ac1 , and c, which occurs t
periods later, is increased by a small amount Ac. Is this good for social welfare?
If the changes are infinitesimal, one can use the marginal utilities to evaluate the
changes, and the change in social welfare is then equal to
AW = -U'(cj)Acj

+ U'(c 1 )Ac.

(3)

This can be expressed in units of present consumption by dividing every term by
the marginal utility of ci, which gives the net present value (NPV)
Act +

U'(c1 )

Ac.

(4)

Equating this expression for the NPV of the change in welfare with its
discounted value, -Ac

1

+ (l+&) Ac,

gives the following formula for the

discount rate
(5)

(U'(c)

The discount rate is a direct expression of the relative priority of the two
individuals (or generations) i and j, modulated by the length of time t between
the two individuals. If the future individual j is better off than the present
individual i, the expression is greater than one; that is, the discount rate is
positive.
This methodology provides a discount rate that can serve to evaluate small
projects. Any project that yields a rate of return greater than the discount rate is
beneficial to social welfare. However, for big projects, the marginal utilities are
no longer acceptable in the computation and one has to make a direct evaluation
of the change in social welfare.
When the marginal utility is equal to CP, the formula for the discount rate
simplifies to
+

19

=1+

g )P

(6)

See Section VILB.
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where gj = (c 1 /c)lIt - 1 is the average annual growth rate of consumption
between the present and year t. When gij is small, Equation (6) can be
approximated by the famous Ramsey formula: 20
6 = pgj.

(7)

A reasonable value for inequality aversion is p = 221 while a standard estimate
for the growth rate is 1.3.2 Plugging these values into Equation (7) gives a
discount rate of approximately 2.6 percent. (Stern adds a 0.1 percent term due to
the risk of extinction of humanity,23 but we ignore this term for the moment).
III. OBJECTIONS TO THIS METHODOLOGY
The discount rate obtained with the methodology introduced in the
previous section may be quite different from the market rate, and this has
triggered a vivid debate. On one side are those who are happy applying the usual
cost-benefit discount rates to long-run policies; on the other are those who think
that intergenerational equity requires granting greater consideration to future
generations. The debate is described in an influential text 24 as a confrontation
between a descriptive approach and a prescriptive approach, while Posner and
Weisbach use the labels "positivists" and "ethicists." 25
Such labels are puzzling because, as Posner and Weisbach write, "in the
end, of course, the positivists' approach is worth nothing unless it can be

20

Frank P. Ramsey, A MathematicalTheor ofSaving, 38 Econ J 543, 546 (1928).

21

22

See Marc Fleurbaey and Philippe Michel, Transfer Principlesand Inequaky Aversion, with an Appication
to Optimal Growth, 42 Math Soc Sci 1, 5 (2001) (identifying two as the lowest value that guarantees
that increasing the consumption of one individual and reducing the consumption of a richer
individual by the same percentage (without reversing their relative positions) always improves
social welfare. Note that in such a transfer the rich gives more than the poor receives). But see
Stem, The Stern Review at 183-84 (cited in note 5) (using a value of one); Giles Atkinson, et al,
Sibings, Not Tr/plets: Social Preferencesfor Risk, Inequaiy and Time in Discounting Climate Change, 3,
2009-26 Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal *1 (2009), online at
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2009-26 (visited Oct 15, 2012)
(using values as high as four).
Stern, The Stern Review at 185 (cited in note 5).

23

Id at 184.

24

K.J. Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equly, Discounting and Economic Eficeny, in James P. Bruce,
Hoesung Lee, and Erik F. Haites, eds, Clmate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate
Change 125, 131 (Cambridge 1996).
Posner and Weisbach, Clmate Change justice at 149 (cited in note 1).

25
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defended on ethical grounds."26 So, the debate is not so much one between
ethics and something else as it is a debate within ethics.

A. Objection That Using Non-Market Rates Is Undemocratic
Proponents27 of the descriptive approach invoke two ethical arguments.
The first is that market rates reflect the preferences of the population, so that it
is undemocratic to propose using different rates. 28 The climate econormists 29 who
propose using lower rates for climate policies are imposing their views on a
population that appears to care less about the future than they do. (Gollier, in
this issue, actually shows that risk-free market rates are lower than what ethicists
propose!') This first argument is unacceptable, but the reasons why it cannot be
accepted are far from simple.
There are several mistakes in the argument. First, this reasoning would
impose aggregate population preferences on every evaluator. Obviously, there
are many views among members of the population. If an evaluator wants to
examine a development path with a great concern for the future, there must be
some people in the population who share this concern. Even if nobody shares
this concern, the evaluator might be right to disagree with everyone else. Just as
there is freedom of thought, and just as different political parties can have their
own platforms, so too there should be room for economic evaluation that
embodies various views about social welfare and the principles of
intergenerational equity.
The reply to this objection will certainly be: different economic evaluations
may be conducted, but the government, in its decisions, cannot impose
idiosyncratic views on the whole population. This is a powerful argument, even
though history contains praiseworthy examples of governments imposing
26

Id at 149-50.

27

See generally, Nordhaus, 45 J Econ Lit at 691 (cited in note 7); Nancy Birdsall and Andrew Steer,
Act Now on Global Warming-But Don't Cook the Books, 30 Fin & Dev 6, 6-8 (1993); Alan S.
Manne, The Rate of Time Preference: Impcaions for the Greenhouse Debate, in Nebojsa Nakicenovic, et
al, eds, Integrative Assessment ofMiigation, Impacts, and Adaptation to Climate Change 467 (IIASA 1994),
online at http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/PUB/Documents/CP-94-009.pdf (visited Oct 26,
2012).

28

See Nordhaus, 45 J Econ Lit at 691 (cited in note 7) (criticizing the sort of "Government House
utilitarianism"-an arrangement where a utilitarian elite makes decisions based on its own rather
than the population's beliefs--espoused by The Stern Review).
See, for example, Stem, The Stern Reiew (cited in note 5); William R. Cline, The Economics of Global
Warming (Institute for International Economics 1992).
Christian Gollier, The Debate on Discouning: Reconcilng Posidtists and Ethidsts, 13 Chi J Intl L 549,

29
30

552-58 (2013).
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policies contrary to majority opinion (for example, the abolition of the death
penalty in France in 1981)."' But this democratic argument does not imply that
the market interest rate should serve as the discount rate. It only requires a
democratic debate to take place. This debate will have to address the various
arguments underlying the computation of the discount rate. One cannot pretend
to know the conclusions of this debate in order to prevent some propositions
from reaching the debate. Democratic principles cannot be used to bar some
(minimally sound) ethical principles from the forum.
One could still try to argue that the market does tell us something about the
population's preferences about intertemporal tradeoffs. The issue, though, is
what that "something" is. Market interest rates are determined jointly by
technological possibilities (the productivity of capital) and by the willingness of
investors to transfer wealth into the future in exchange for some return. Just like
the relative market price of oranges and pears implies that all buyers active on
both markets are willing to trade oranges for pears at this relative price, the
interest rate indicates investors' and savers' common willingness to trade
consumption (marginal rate of substitution) across time. This is true, but
investors and savers, whose preferences are reflected in the market interest rate,
are making decisions to transfer their present wealth to themselves in a few
years. If they were asked to transfer wealth to other people living all over the
world, in many decades, they might express very different preferences. The
financial markets do not ask them this outlandish question, and therefore we
cannot pretend that their answer to a very different question is adequate for this
purpose. Observe, moreover, that the market interest rate also depends on the
distribution of wealth in the population, which has no reason to be particularly
democratic.
Even if there were markets in which people could express such preferences
(private donations to environmental nongovernmental organizations focused on
the climate might be one relevant source of information), it is doubtful that such
preferences would be more respectable than the outcome of an outright
democratic debate informed by the relevant expertise and considering the best
ethical arguments.
In conclusion, if experts like Stern propose a series of reasonable
arguments leading to the conclusion that climate policies should be evaluatedwith
a discount rate that is much lower than the market interest rate, they cannot be
dismissed as undemocratic and off track. They should be admitted to the
democratic debate and their arguments should be carefully listened to (without
any guarantee that they will be adopted).
31

Michel Forst, The Abokion of the Death Penaly in France, in Council of Europe, The Death Penaly:
Aboition in Europe 105, 113-15 (Council of Europe 1999).
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B. Objection That Non-Market Rates Neglect Opportunity
Costs of Investments
The second argument used by the advocates of the market rate is that this
rate measures the opportunity cost of resources. This is the main argument
considered, and endorsed, by Posner and Weisbach.3 2 It is this argument that
leads Posner and Weisbach to propose using the market interest rate. This
argument is crystal clear. Suppose a climate policy costs $1 today and brings
benefits worth $14.40 in one hundred years. According to Table 1, this policy is
better than the consumption of the $1 today if the discount rate is 2.7 percent or
lower. The objection is that investing the same amount at the market rate, which
is supposedly greater, would bring greater benefits in the future. Using a lower
discount rate than the market rate is therefore branded as a recipe for choosing
dominated policies-policies that either cost more today or pay less tomorrow,
or both.
This argument is very simple and extremely powerful. But it aims at the
wrong target. More precisely, it relies, in our view, on a misunderstanding of the
role of the discount rate. The purpose of the discount rate, as explained in the
previous section, is to make consumption levels or monetary values comparable
across time. It makes it possible to compute the net present value (NPV) of any
change to the status quo. If the NPV is positive, the change is an improvement.
But this does not mean that this particular change is optimal. In order to choose
the best policy or project, one must compare the NPV (computed with whatever
discount rate seems appropriate) of all options, including ordinary market
investments. Clearly, with this methodology, if one option costs less today or
pays more tomorrow (or both) than another option, it will be deemed
preferable, whatever the discount rate.
There is therefore no danger that adopting a lower discount rate than the
market rate could induce inefficient (in other words, dominated at each period)
choices. It will only imply making different choices among the efficient (in other
words, undominated) options. With a lower discount rate, one will choose to
invest more for the future, but one will never be tempted to invest at a low rate
of return when a higher rate of return is possible. If a business-as-usual
investment policy that puts all savings in the financial market brings more
benefits to future generations than a mitigation policy aimed at curbing
greenhouse gas emissions, even the most devoted disciple of the Stern Reiew will
approve it.

32

Posner and Weisbach, Clmate Change Justice at 146-47 (cited in note 1).

33

Id at 167-68.
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To illustrate this point, Table 2 presents four policies, with their
undiscounted benefits and their NPV according to two different values of the
discount rate. (The 1.4 percent is from the Stern Revienl' and 5.5 percent has
been advocated by Nordhaus.) Policies A and C are market investments
earning 5.5 percent, policy B is a climate policy with impacts equivalent to a 10
percent monetary return, and policy D is a climate policy with impacts
equivalent to a 6 percent return. Policies A and B yield returns in one hundred
years, while policies C and D pay in five hundred years. The 5.5 percent discount
rate enables us to check that climate policies B and D are not dominated by
market investments-but is it also helpful for choosing between B and D? Using
this higher rate suggests that B, which has impacts of greater value in the shorter
term, is preferable to D. But the lower discount rate of 1.4 percent suggests
otherwise, while still revealing that these two climate policies are not dominated
by the market. It is therefore important to have a good discount rate, not so
much to check if the market dominates a climate policy-because any discount
rate will do for that limited exercise-but to be able to choose between
undominated policies.
TABLE 2. How TO CHOOSE POLICIES WITH VARIOUS DISCOUNT RATES
Policy option (type, average annual rate of return)

A

B

C

D

(market, 5.5%)

(climate, 10%)

(market, 5.5%)

(climate, 6%)

Time horizon
(years)

Income stream over time ($)

0

-1

-1

-1

-1

100

211

13,781

0

0

500

0

0

4.23 x 1011

4.50

Discount rate
(per annum)

x

1012

Net present value ($)

1.40%

51.66

3430.41

4.05 x 10'

4.30 x 109

5.50%

0.00

64.17

0.00

9.63

Legend: Poliy A costs $1 today andpays $21 1 in one hundredyears;at a 1.4 percent
discount rate, itspresent value is $51.66; at a 5.5 percent discount rate, itspresent value

is$0.
34

Stern, The Stem Rediew at 184-85 (cited in note 5).

35

William D. Nordhaus, A Question ofBalance 76, 178 (Yale 2008).
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In conclusion to this point, when Posner and Weisbach write: "even if the
ethicists' arguments are entirely correct, we must still carefully consider the
opportunity cost of projects and pick those with the highest returns,""6 we fully
agree, and every reasonable "ethicist" should agree, too. But this does not imply
that the market rate of return should be used for the evaluation of projects.
Note that the use of discount rates would be superfluous if the problem
were to choose between policies with similar time profiles like policies A and B
in Table 2, because their own rates of return can be directly compared. It is only
when there are time trade-offs that computing the NPV becomes useful, as in
the comparison between policies B and D. (Actually, as we will show later,
projects with the same time profile may affect different populations, thus
meriting different discount rates, which is equivalent to incorporating social
benefits in the computation of their rate of return.37)
C. Further Sources of Divergence from Posner and Weisbach
There is another related methodological issue on which we disagree with
Posner and Weisbach. They propose using the discount rate in a limited way:
"Discounting ... should be seen only as a method of choosing projects, not as a
method of determining our obligations to the future."38 This dichotomy is a
direct consequence of the tension produced by their idea that one should use the
market discount rate for the choice of projects, but nevertheless follow the
ethicists' rate to decide how much to save for the benefit of future generations.
In other words, two discount rates would be used in the methodology proposed
by Posner and Weisbach, although they do not make this fully explicit (and
would perhaps allow for considerations other than standard welfarism to
determine how much should be saved). The low discount rate of the ethicists
would serve to check if more should be invested overall, whereas the market rate
would govern the choice of particular projects to ensure selection of the most
efficient options.
There is no need for such a dichotomous methodology. The "ethically
right" discount rate can be used both for the selection of projects and for
deciding how much to save for the future, which in fact constitute one and the
same set of decisions-selecting the projects includes choosing the total amount
that is invested. One will first choose the highest-NPV investment plans (which
are those with the highest rate of return for their particular time profile) and go

36

Posner and Weisbach, Climate ChangeJustice at 161 (cited in note 1).

37

See Section V.
Posner and Weisbach, Climate ChangeJusice at 168 (cited in note 1).

38
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on approving investments as long as the NPV of the remaining projects is
positive. Note that the discount rate itself goes up in the process, because as
more is invested for the future, future generations grow better off, which tends
to raise the discount rate. 9 Therefore a low discount rate advocated now, against
the background of a business-as-usual scenario" in which the future generations
are in jeopardy, need not be the indication of the market rate that will prevail
after the recommended investment has been made. The convergence value of
the market rate will be somewhere between the initial market rate and the
relatively lower initial discount rate.
Finally, let us briefly consider another objection raised by Posner and
Weisbach against the ethicists. They claim that choosing projects as the ethicists
propose may be futile when private decisions to consume rather than save may
partly undo the public investments. Again, the ethicists can only agree and
proclaim their innocence. Their criteria are meant to bear on final consequences,
not on mistaken estimates of the consequences. If public investment exactly
crowds out private investment, 41 so that the government cannot influence the
macroeconomic savings rate, there is no point for the government to try to
change it and no point in applying any discount rate to this kind of decision. If,
in a less extreme case, public savings only partly crowd out private savings, this
must be taken into account, too, for an accurate description of the consequences
of the policy.
IV. DISCOUNTING UNDER RISK
Having rebutted the main objections to the social welfare approach
introduced in Section II, we now proceed to apply this methodology to climate
policies. The basic methodology described in Section II ignores the important
fact that the future is risky. This is especially relevant for the long run horizons
of climate policies. Thus, we now extend the model, beginning by characterizing
two different sorts of risk. First, the future growth of consumption is not known
with certainty. Second, the effect of policies in the future is itself uncertain in
general.42

39

This directly follows from the Ramsey formula introduced in Section II.

40

That is, a scenario in which there are no investments in mitigation or adaptation policies.

41

See Roger W. Spencer and William P. Yohe, The "Crowding Out" of Private Expenditures by Fiscal
online at
Policy Actions, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 12, 15 (1970),
(visited
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/70/10/ExpendituresOctl970.pdf
Oct 11, 2012) (The crowding out phenomenon occurs when public spending increases interest
rates and reduces private spending.).
Both forms of uncertainty can be due to either random elements in otherwise well-understood
mechanisms, or to epistemic uncertainty due to a lack of consensus about the mechanisms.

42
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A. Considering Future Growth
Weitzman has proposed an interesting argument in favor of adopting even
lower discount rates for investments that pay in the very long run when there is
a background risk concerning the growth rate.43 Weitzman's argument is not
based on the social welfare approach, but, in a similar fashion as Gollier," we
present a variant of Weitzman's model that enables us to connect his argument
to Ramsey's formula.45 We later discuss Weitzman's formulation, which has been
retained by Posner and Weisbach."
Suppose that there is uncertainty about future consumption, and that our
criterion is the expected value of social welfare (which is also, in the case of
utilitarianism, the sum of expected utilities).47 Let us again consider two small
changes, Ac1 and Acj. Unlike the level of consumption, these changes are certain.
The change in social welfare, from Equation (3), is now equal to

-U'(cj)Ac + E[U'(cj)Ac1 ],

(8)

where El[*] denotes the expected value, and the formula for the discount rate
from Equation (5) becomes
+

*

(E[U'(cj)]
6=kU'(c
1 ))(9

.

(9)

(In our model with uncertainty, 8* now denotes the discount rate, and we keep
the notation 6 for the discount rate in a particular state of the world.) What
Weitzman noticed is that this kind of formula involves neither the expected
value of 1 + 6, nor the expected value of (1 + 8)t, but the expected value of
(1 + 6)-t. More precisely, recalling from Equation (5) in the previous section
that in every particular state of the world, U'(c 1 )/U'(c) = (1 + 6 )-t Equation
(9) becomes

43

Weitzman, 36 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at 204-05 (cited in note 3).

44

Gollier, 85

45

See Equation (7) in Section II.
Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change jusice at 152 (cited in note 1).

46
47

J Pub Econ

at 160-61 (cited in note 4).

The criterion guiding the policy evaluation is some measure of social welfare-say, the sum over
the whole population of expected utilities, or the utility of the least-well-off member of the
population. Thus, as used in this article, "criterion" generally refers to any particular model (or
equation) defining a measure of social welfare. See generally Amartya Sen, Choice, Welfare, and
Measurement (MIT 1982). See also note 14.

578

Vol 13 No. 2

Climate PolidesDesere a Negative Discount Rate

Fleurbaeyand Zuber

1 + 6 = (E[(1+

6

)-t)1/t.

(10)

Now, what is remarkable about this expression is that it has the form of a wellknown quasi-arithmetic mean of the form, (E[x-t)-11 t, which is known to
converge to the minimum value of x when t tends to infinity. Therefore, in the vey
long run, the discount rate under risk converges to the lowest possible value of the risk-free

discount rate.48 This is a remarkable result. It implies that for long-term
evaluations, one can focus on the worst-case scenarios in which future
consumption is the lowest and the corresponding discount rate is the lowest.
To illustrate this result, consider the situation in which there is an 80
percent chance that the growth rate will be 1.3 percent on average in the future,
but there is a 20 percent chance that it will be zero. Let us retain p = 2, so that
by applying Equation (7), we find that the risk-free discount rate is either 2.6
percent or 0 percent. This example, illustrated in Table 3, shows that while
convergence to the lowest value (0 percent) may be rather slow, the discount
rate is very quickly well below the probability-weighted average discount rate of
0.8 X 2.6 = 2.08 percent.
TABLE 3. THE DISCOUNT RATE OVER TIME WITH UNCERTAIN GROWTH

Time horizon

Discount rate

(years)

(per annum)

50

1.74%

100

1.35%

200

0.80%

500

0.32%

1000

0.16%

Note: There is an 80 percent chance that the growth rate will be 1.3 percent and a 20
percentchance it nill be 0 percent

Posner and Weisbach propose an intuitive explanation of this result
directly based on Weitzman's original formulation.49 For every possible value of
cj there is a corresponding discount rate 6, in other words, a discount rate that
would prevail if this particular scenario were bound to occur (which Weitzman

48

Weitzman, 36 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at 204-05 (cited in note 3).

49

Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change justice at 152 (cited in note 1); Weitzman, 36 J Envir Econ &
Mgmt at 205 (cited in note 3).
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and Posner and Weisbach equate to the market rate, rather than the Ramsey 0
rate)." The expected value of the NPV of the investment, when all possible
states of the world (more specifically, all possible discount rates) are considered,
is then equal to
E [-Ac +

Acj] = -Aci + E

Ac1 .

By equating the right-hand side of Equation (11) to -Aci +

(11)

Ac,

one

directly obtains Formula (10).
This Weitzman-Posner-Weisbach derivation of the result remains,
however, a little mysterious because it is not obvious why one should compute
the expected present value of a project rather than some other formula. In fact,
in general the expected present value is not the relevant figure. What should be
computed, in the Ramsey approach, is the ratio of the expected values of the
marginal utilities:
-Ac

E[U'(cj)]
+ T ()]Ac,
E[U'(cm)

(12)

but when there is no uncertainty about present consumption, the expected value
of the marginal social value of Ci is just the sure value E[U'(cI)] = U'(c), and
therefore the ratio of expected values is, in this specific case of no uncertainty
about the present, the expected value of the ratio.
B. Uncertainty about Returns to Investments
As mentioned earlier, risk typically affects not just the background growth
rate of consumption but also the future yield of the investment. Taking account
of this risk further complicates the discount rate. It is easy to show that the
discount rate applied to expected benefits should be lower for projects with
greater returns in states in which the marginal social utility of the beneficiaries is
greater.52
Because both growth and the benefits of climate policies are uncertain, we
now evaluate whether Weitzman's result of convergence to the lowest discount
rate remains valid when the second layer of uncertainty is introduced. If risk

50

51

52

Recall from Equation (7) that the Ramsey discount rate is the product of the coefficient of
inequality aversion and the annual growth rate of consumption.
Posner and Weisbach, Climate ChangeJustice at 152 (cited in note 1); Weitzman, 36 J Envir Econ &
Mgmt at 205 (cited in note 3).
See Gollier, 13 Chi J Ind L at 559 (cited in note 30).
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takes the form of an uncertain rate of return on the investment, then, keeping
the possible rates of return in the various states of the world fixed and varying
the horizon, one obtains an interesting generalization of Weitzman's result. In
the long run, the discount rate that should be applied to the expected return of
the investment tends to

min (i

1+r

r) max(1 + r)- 1,

(13)

where 6 and r are, respectively, the discount rate and the rate of return in
various possible states of the world. When r is not a random term, the
expression in (13) simplifies to min(1 + 6) - 1 = min(6), that is, the lowest
discount rate, as was explained previously.13 But when r is random, other
possibilities arise.
Let us first explain how to derive the result in (13). If one invests $1 in a
project that has a random rate of return r in t periods, the marginal effect on
expected social welfare is equal to
-U'(c)

+ E[U'(cj)(1 + r) t .

(14)

In present value, this reads
-1

+ E

_(1(

U(c)

-1 + E

+ r)t
-

+

+r

(15)

In order to solve for S*-the discount rate applied to the expected (uncertain)
returns-now express the right-hand side Equation (15) in terms of S*:
-1 + E

11+r

t

E[1+r]t
-- 1+S

.

(16)

From this equation one immediately derives
E[1 + r]t

(1 1+rt
+6*)
*(17)
E
t
[1+81

Both in the numerator (=E[1 + r]t) and in the denominator
(= E[(1 + r)/(1 + 5)]t), the greatest term dominates when t goes to infinity,
which implies the generalized formula for 6* in Equation (13).

s3

See text following Equation (10).
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The generalized formula (13) is particularly interesting when it is used to
compare different kinds of investments. An investment that is most profitable in
good times (such as, typically, a market investment) may have a low (1 +
8)1(1 + r) ratio in relatively good times when 8 is high, or in bad times when r
is low. In both cases, the appropriate discount rate is greater than the lowest 6.
In contrast, an investment that is most profitable in bad times (such as a climate
policy that averts dangerous climate change) will definitely have to be evaluated
with the lowest 8 because its greatest rate of return will happen in the states with
the lowest discount rate. In conclusion, Weitzman's argument that, in the long
run, the discount rate converges to the lowest value may have to be watered
down when applied to ordinary investments with returns that are correlated with
growth, but seems to retain its full force for projects that are aimed at protecting
us against climate hazards.
More recently, Weitzman5 4 proposed an even more striking, "dismal
theorem" by arguing that the discount rate may come arbitrarily close to -100
percent, even in a finite time horizon, implying that we should give absolute
priority to the future.ss But this argument is much less convincing and a
discussion of it can be found in a prior paper." We do agree with Weitzman,
however, that a negative discount rate may be justified for climate policies, as
discussed in Section VI.
V. PRIORITIZING THE POOR IN THE LONG RUN
We now develop a line of argument that incorporates not only
intergenerational but also intragenerational inequality. This argument, in
combination with the phenomenon described in the previous section of longrun convergence to the lowest discount rate, reinforces the presumption that
negative values are relevant for evaluating climate policies.
Framing the discounting debate about the discount rate is somewhat
misleading because there is not a single discount rate but rather as many discount
rates as there are distributions of costs and benefits among different
populations. We have already seen this phenomenon when the discount rate to
be used depends on the time lag between generations, as in Table 3.
More generally, the formula that determines the discount rate is about
changes in the consumption of two individuals, i and j. The value of the

5

ss
56

See generally Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeing and Intepreing the Economics of Catastrophic Climate
Change, 91 Rev Econ & Stat 1 (2009).
Id at 8.
Marc Fleurbaey and St6phane Zuber, Ex Post Intergenerational Equiy and Discouning *24-27
(unpublished paper, May 2012) (on file with the author).
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discount rate depends on the consumption levels of these two individuals.
Imagine now that two individuals from the same future generation, j and k, not
just one individual U alone), will benefit from an increase in their consumption
at the expense of one individual, i, from the present generation. The formula for
the change in social welfare, introduced in Equation (3), becomes
-U'(ci)Aci +U'(c)Acj

+ U'(Ck)ACk*

(18)

As before, one can compute the present value by dividing by the marginal utility
of ci, and then equate this with a formula using person-to-person discount rates
8.j and 1k:
Aci +.

U'(ci)

Acj +

U'(ci)

ACk

1
1
(-Ac
+ JAc+ (1+ Sik)t

(19)

Now this formula is structurally similar to the formula obtained in the case of
risk.17 Imagine that j and k share the benefit of the investment, B, in fixed
akB. The right-hand side of Equation (19)
proportions: Ac1 = ajB and ACk
can then be written as
1
-Ac+ (+

(20)

5)t B,

for
1
(1I)

1

1
+ ak

=a
1(+8.5i)t

k1

+ik)t*

(21)

The same argument as in the previous section implies that in the very long
run-in other words, when t tends to infinity-8 will converge to the smallest
value of person-to-person discount rates. The smallest value is obtained for the
individuals who are the worst off in the future generation. Therefore, in the very
long run, only the worst off members of future generations matter. (More
precisely, one must focus on the worst off among those who benefit from the
investment-those whose share is null play no role in the formula in Equation
(21).)

57

See Equation (10) in Section IV.
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A complication is that the investment cost is generally paid by several
members of the present generation. If one thinks of a public policy such as a
mitigation effort in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, many individuals
may be involved. Let us therefore consider the problem when two individuals i
and I from the present generation contribute in fixed shares ai and a,, so that
Ac = a1 D and Ac, = ajD. But to simplify the presentation, let us come back to
the situation in which only one individual from a future generation, j, stands to
benefit from the investment. The formula for the change in social welfare
becomes:

-U'(c)Aci - U'(c1 )Ac1 +U'(cj)Acj

= -(U'(ci)a + U'(ct)a 1 )D + U'(cj)Acj.

(22)

The present value can therefore be written as
-D +

U(C)
Ac = -D +
(U'(ci)ai + U'(cl)al)
(1 +

6

)t

Ac.,

(23)

for
(1+ 6)t = at(1 + S)t

+ al(i + 6ty)

(24)

This formula has the opposite behavior to the previous one: When t tends
to infinity, 6 tends to the greatest value of the person-to-person discount rates.
What is remarkable is that the greatest value is obtained for the worst off of the
present generation, among those who share the cost.
When many individuals share the cost now and many individuals share the
benefit in the future, these two results remain jointly valid, even though the
formula is more complicated: In the very long run, the discount rate conveTges to the
worst-off-to-worst-off discount rate, among the individuals who are affected by the
change in consumption to be evaluated, that is, the discount rate applying to
transfers from the worst off of the present generation to the worst off of the
future generation." This result does not depend on the values of the shares,
although, of course, the speed of convergence is influenced by the shares."
Table 4 illustrates this phenomenon with four individuals, two from each
generation. Shares in cost and benefit are made to be equal (half-and-half) in

5

See Fleurbaey and Zuber, Ex Post IntergeneraionalEquity and Discounting at *18 (cited in note 56)
(providing a formal statement and a prooo.

5

Id.
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every generation. In the present generation the poor consume one unit and the
rich consume five units. The consumption of the poor incurs a growth of 1.3
percent per year, while the consumption of the rich has a growth rate of 1.5
percent. We keep p = 2.
TABLE 4. PERSON-TO-PERSON DISCOUNT RATES

Discount rates (per annum)

m
Time
horizon

SPerson-to-Person
Society as aPor
Poorwhole
Poor

(years)

Rih
Rich-

PoPoor-

RcRich-

Poor

Rich

Rich

50

2.63%

2.62%

-3.78%

9.87%

3.02%

100

2.63%

2.62%

-0.63%

6.39%

3.02%

200

2.63%

2.62%

0.98%

4.69%

3.02%

500

2.62%

2.62%

1.96%

3.69%

3.02%

1000

2.62%

2.62%

2.29%

3.35%

3.02%

The table shows that the poor-to-poor discount rate is a good indication of
the social discount rate in this context, even at a moderate horizon (but this
depends on the assumption about the shares of costs and benefits and is not
always true). Observe that the rich-to-poor and the poor-to-rich discount rates
change with the horizon because their relative consumption does not evolve
according to a constant growth rate. In the beginning the poor subpopulation
remains poorer than the rich of the first generation, which justifies a negative
rich-to-poor discount rate, whereas the rich subpopulation is much richer than
the poor of the first generation, which justifies a high poor-to-rich discount rate.
In the long run, the relative consumption levels of beneficiary-donor correspond
to average annual growth rates that converge to the growth rate of the receiving
subpopulation, which explains the convergence of the specific person-to-person
discount rates toward a discount rate that is specific to the beneficiary rather
than specific to the donor. (In this particular setting with separate
subpopulations with specific growth rates, the discount rate is also a weighted
average of the two subpopulations' discount rates, and converges to the lowest
discount rate-in other words, the discount rate of the subpopulation with the
lowest growth rate, which ultimately becomes the poorer subpopulation even if
it started out richer.)
VI. NEGATIVE DISCOUNT RATES FOR CLIMATE POLICIES
We now come to the main thesis of this Article. Why should climate
policies be evaluated with a negative discount rate? As we have just seen, the
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person-to-person discount rate is negative when the present donor is richer than the future
beneficiaU. Thus, if we consider long-run policies, the discount rate should be
negative when the poorest contributors to the policy are richer than the poorest
beneficiaries. It is plausible that many climate policies satisfy this condition.
Mitigation efforts, when they are well conceived, should put the financial burden
on the high emitters, who are typically among the affluent members of the
present generation, but such policies will benefit many members of future
generations. Moreover, it is often said that the most vulnerable to climate change
are the poorest,60 so that many of the future beneficiaries will be among the
poorest of their generation. Can we hope that the poorest of future generations
will be better off than the middle class of the present generation? Sadly, this
appears unlikely. Therefore, climate policies that avoid imposing a burden on the
poor members of the present generation deserve to be evaluated with a negative
discount rate.
Another element reinforces this thesis. Weitzman's result of a convergence
toward the lowest discount rate in the case of risk combines with the result
presented in this section. In the very long run, the discount rate converges to the
worst-off-to-worst-off' discount rate of the worst-case scenario. Therefore, even if
there are favorable scenarios in which destitute populations catch up and reach
good standards of living, it is enough to assign a positive probability to dark
scenarios in which the standards of living of the poorest stagnate in order to
validate our conclusion that negative discount rates are appropriate for
evaluating climate (especially mitigation) policies.
Of course, this does not mean that such policies should have greater
priority than other policies such as redistribution toward the poor members of
the present generation. 62 As we saw in Section II, choosing optimal policies
requires not only checking that a chosen policy improves the status quo (that is,
has a positive NPV), but also involves a comparison among positive NPVs. At a
minimum, however, we want to argue strongly against the popular thesis that the
market rate should be applied indiscriminately to the evaluation of all policies,
independent of the affected populations.

60

61

62

See, for example, World Bank, World Development Report 2010: Development and Cmate Change
(World Bank 2010).
As explained in the previous section (Section V), this is the discount rate to be used for transfers
from the worst off of the present generation to the worst off of a future generation.
Thomas C. Schelling, IntergeneraionalDiscounting,25 Ener Poly 395, 400 (1995).
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VII. BEYOND UTILITARIANISM
A. Inequality Aversion, Risk Aversion, and Correlated Climate
Risks
So far we have adopted the utilitarian approach, which simply adds up
individual utilities to evaluate social welfare. This approach predominates in the
debate about discounting for the long run. The utilitarian approach is quite
acceptable in the absence of risk, because the utility function can then be
chosen, as suggested above, to embody the aversion to inequalities in
consumption that the evaluator endorses. 64 Under certain conditions, then, the
utilitarian social welfare function can be applied by advocates of prioritarian and
egalitarian theories of justice.s
In the presence of risk, things are harder. The coefficient of inequality
aversion also becomes a coefficient of risk aversion if the utilitarian criterion is
then applied as the sum of expected utilities (or equivalently, the expected sum
of utilities). There is therefore a dilemma. One either respects the risk aversion
of the population (assuming away a potential heterogeneity of risk preferences
across individuals), which severely constrains the degree of inequality aversion,
or one adopts a coefficient of inequality aversion on the basis of ethical
principles but then potentially imposes on the population a high degree of risk
aversion that appears paternalistic. This is a classical problem in social ethicsover fifty years ago, in fact, Harsanyi viewed it as a key justification of
utilitarianism"-and it continues to be discussed in the context of discounting."

63
64
65

See Equation (1) in Section II.
See text accompanying notes 14-18.
Formally, the utilitarian social welfare can also be adopted by prioritarians and egalitarians who
accept the property of subgroup separability that underlies the additive form of the criterion.
Subgroup separability means that the evaluation of a change affecting a subgroup of the
population can ignore the consumption level of the unconcerned individuals and focus on the
affected subgroup only. By an important theorem proved by Debreu and Gorman, subgroup
separability implies that the evaluation criterion can be represented by an additive function. See
Charles Blackorby, Daniel Primont, and R. Robert Russell, Duaiy, Separabily, and Functional
Structure: Theory and Economic Appiations (North-Holland 1978); Gerard Debreu, TopologicalMethods
in Cardinal Utli Theog, in Kenneth J. Arrow, Samuel Karlin, and Patrick Suppes, eds,

Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, 1959: Proceedings of the First Stanford Smposium 16, 24
(Stanford 1960); William M. Gorman, The Structure of Utiky Functions, 35 Rev Econ Studies 367,
381-83 (1968).

66

John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Wefare, Individuaistic Ethics, and InterpersonalComparisons of Utibly, 63

67

Pol Econ 309, 321 (1955).
See, for example, Louis Kaplow and David Weisbach, Discount Rates, Social Judgments, Individuals'
Risk Preferences, and Uncertaino,42J Risk & Uncertainty 125, 140-41 (2011).
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Fleurbaey has proposed a compromise, arguing that respecting preferences
is much less compelling under uncertainty than in a risk-free context because in
the context of risk, by definition, individuals are not perfectly informed about
the consequences of their decisions." In particular, respecting preferences under
risk may even appear to betray the individuals' informed preferences when the
evaluator has information about the final distribution of individual well-being.
Suppose, for instance, that individuals are willing to take a risk, even though they
know in advance that the only consequence of this risk is a widening of
inequalities, without any overall gain. At the individual level the risk may appear
attractive, but at the social level it is already known that many will be unlucky
and that these individuals are actually acting against their true interests when
they are willing to take such a risk. In other words, when making a decision
under risk, each individual focuses on his own payoffs and ignores the
correlation of his outcome with that of other individuals. A social evaluator can
take account of this correlation and forecast how many individuals will turn out
to have acted against their ultimate interests.
This observation leads to the conclusion that respecting risk preferences is
not always necessary. But it also suggests that respecting risk preferences
remains an attractive idea when there is perfect correlation between individuals,
because in such a situation an evaluator cannot forecast whether some of them
would be acting against their interests by accepting the risk. Fleurbaey shows
that when the requirement to respect risk preferences is limited to the case of
perfect correlation, criteria other than utilitarianism become acceptable,
permitting a greater degree of inequality aversion. His Theorem 1 stipulates that,
under minimal conditions of rationality under uncertainty, all such criteria must
take the form of the expected value of the equally distributed equivalent (EDE)
utility, which is the level of utility that would yield the same social welfare if it
were equally distributed across all individuals. 9
Let us illustrate this with a particular functional form. Suppose that
E[u(c)] represents the risk preferences of the individuals,70 assuming away any
heterogeneity across individuals in order to keep things simple and in line with
the literature on discounting. Suppose that in absence of risk one would like to
use the prioritarian criterion Zirp(u(ct)), where p is a concave function

68

69

Marc Fleurbaey, Assessing Risky SocialSituations, 118 J Pol Econ 649, 654-659 (2010).
Id at 657. The notion of EDE is due to Anthony B. Atkinson, On the Measurement of Inequality,

J Econ
70

Theory 244, 250 (1970).
We now use the lower case to distinguish this utility function, which embodies risk attitudes, from
the previous upper-case utility function, which embodied the ethical values of the evaluator about
inequality.
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embodying a priority for the worst off in utility. Then the expected EDE
criterion takes the form
E <p-1

<p(u(cj))

,(25)

where <p (*) denotes the inverse function and n is the number of individuals.
In an earlier paper," we study how this kind of criterion can be used in the
computation of the discount rate. What is important is that the discount rate can
then be approximated by the usual Ramsey discount rate, obtained for the
additive social welfare function & <p(u(c)),72 to which one has to add a term
that depends (positively) on the correlation between the well-being of the
beneficiaries of the investment and social welfare at the global level. (There is an
additional term capturing the attitude toward population size reflected by the
criterion-an issue that will be explained later.)
It is not easy to figure out whether this result pushes in the direction of
raising or lowering the discount rate for climate policies. A primary issue is
whether climate risks generate common risks for most populations or induce
negative correlations. In the case of common risks, the correlation term is
positive and tends to raise the discount rate. The case of negative correlations is
possible if a change in the climate would actually be beneficial in the high
latitudes where the most affluent populations are now settled, whereas it would
be dramatic for the subtropical areas in which the most vulnerable populations
live.
But even if negative correlations between subpopulations occur, it is still
possible for the correlation term to be positive. Indeed, recall that in the long
run, the poor members of the future generations are those who matter for the
discount rate. If the degree of inequality aversion (in other words, the concavity
of function <p(.)) is strong, social welfare as measured by the EDE is then close
in value to the lowest utility in society, and therefore directly correlated with the
well-being of the worst off.
Not much is known about the size of the correlation term and simulations
are not easy to perform because they require considering scenarios that describe
the situation of the whole human species, from beginning to end. An example of
simulations is provided in the Appendix and shows that the difference between
criteria may be far from negligible.

71

Fleurbaey and Zuber, Ex PostIntergenerationalEquity and Discouningat *22 (cited in note 56).

72

When applying Equation (1), however, one must of course replace the function U(c) that appears
in Equation (5) by the composition function v(u(C)).
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B. The Risk of Extinction and Optimal Population Size
In the Stern Review there is a 0.1 percent additional term that comes from
the estimated exogenous 1/1000 risk per annum of extinction of the species due
to cosmic phenomena (meteors, eruptions) or unforeseen disruptions of life
systems (pandemics)." The underlying utilitarian reasoning is that the expected
value of total utility is equal to
U(co)+-

999
1000

U(c))+

999\2
(1000)

U(C2)

**,

(26)

The computation of the discount rate then introduces an additional factor,
1

t , into the formula of the marginal change in social welfare:
999 3t

-U'(c)Acj + (1000)

U'(cj)Acj,

(27)

implying
1+

=

1000 fU',(ci)-/
9 0

(Ui))

(28)

which is approximately equivalent to adding 0.001 to the initial value of 6.
Incorporating this factor introduces an additional issue. Different values
for the longevity of the human species imply different sizes for the total human
population, which requires taking a stance on the question of the optimal size of
the population. In the utilitarian galaxy, there are three popular approaches to
integrating population preference into the social welfare criterion. 74 Total
utilitarianism, implicitly adopted above, adds utilities considering that a new
member with a positive utility always improves social welfare.7 Critical-level
utilitarianism(favored by Blackorby and his co-authors) similarly adds utilities but
deducts a fixed amount for every new member. In other words, it computes
the sum of U(c 1 ) - y, which means that adding a new member to society is
considered beneficial only if his utility is above y. The introduction of the critical
level, however, does not affect the marginal utility of consumption for existing
73
74
75
76

In other words, extinction not caused by climate change. Stem, The Stern Revdew at 184 (cited in
note 5).
See Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson, Population Issues in Social Choice
Theory, Weffare Economics, and Ethics (Cambridge 2005) (analyzing all three approaches).
Id at 136.
Id at 137.
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members and therefore does not affect the discount rate. The third approach is
average utilitarianism,which divides total utility by the size of the population and
considers that adding new members is desirable only when their utility is above
average. 7 The computation of the discount rate for this third approach is
substantially different and, to the best of our knowledge, has not been explored.
It is also possible to introduce additional parameters in Equation (25) to
express various attitudes to population size in the EDE criterion. But unlike
critical-level utilitarianism, there is only one constant critical level that can be
taken, and this is the lowest possible utility. Another salient option-which
consists in keeping Equation (25) unchanged and applying it to the comparison
of populations of different sizes-implies an implicit critical level that is equal to
the EDE itself. That is, adding an individual whose well-being is above the EDE
level of the initial population raises the value of the EDE. For a significant
degree of inequality aversion, the EDE is close to the lowest utility in the
population, which may not be an unreasonable option for the critical level.
Depending on which of these two options is chosen, the discount rate will
contain an additional term that is either negatively or positively related to the
correlation between the well-being of the beneficiaries of the investment and the
781
population size.
In conclusion, the appropriate introduction of aversion to inequality in the
presence of risk as well as suitable ethical attitudes about the desirable size of the
population may complicate the computation of the discount rate. As the
discount rate encapsulates the social welfare perspective on transfers across
generations, it is not surprising that these considerations cannot be ignored in its
computation. Though these issues complicate the analysis, it is at least
comforting that it is possible to make the link between ethical principles and the
value obtained for the discount rate explicit and transparent.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Posner and Weisbach advocate selecting projects with a-discount rate equal
to the market rate on the basis of concerns for efficiency and opportunity costs.
However, they accept the idea that ethical principles may play a role in
determining how much in total should be invested for the future. We have
argued here that the social welfare methodology, which derives the discount rate
from the social welfare tradeoffs between individuals belonging to different
generations, takes care of such concerns appropriately and captures the relevant

77
78

Id at 143.
For further details, see Fleurbaey and Zuber, Ex Post IntergeneraionalEquity and Discounting (cited in
note 56).
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ethical issues not just for the selection of projects but also for deciding how
much we should invest overall.
In a nutshell, the discount rate need only serve to measure the relative
social priority of different individuals belonging to different generations.
Therefore there is no need to worry about comparing the discount rate to the
market interest rate, because a rational evaluation in terms of present value at the
chosen discount rate will never fail to avoid dominated investments, and never
fail to choose those with the greatest rate of return. The key message of this
Article is that discount rates are really to be computed between individuals
(person-to-person), which gives a great role to inequalities within and between
generations. Therefore, in the very long run, Weitzman's observation that the
worst-case scenario drives the discount rate has to be supplemented by the
conclusion that the discount rate is also driven by the welfare of the individuals
who are worst off when the investment is paid for and when its benefits are felt.
Therefore, if climate policies such as mitigation efforts are paid for by the
affluent populations of present generations and greatly benefit the worst off of
distant future generations in the most catastrophic scenarios, it is very likely that
the correct discount rates for the evaluation of such policies are negative, which
means that a dollar of benefit in the distant future is worth more than a dollar of
effort today.
In conclusion, we would like to recall that a rigorous evaluation of climate
policies is particularly challenging because it requires rethinking the welfare
economics of risk, time, and population. In such an endeavor the utilitarian
criterion, which remains prominent in the debates about discounting, should be
questioned and, perhaps, replaced with other criteria that better combine a
certain respect for the risk preferences of the population and a substantial degree
of aversion to inequality.
Finally, we should recall a point that has already been made by Stern:79 the
discount rate is useful to evaluate small transfers of consumption across
individuals living at different times. It is not an all-purpose tool that can serve
for all evaluations. It is not adapted to large-scale changes, and it is also not
adapted to evaluating policies that change the size of the population or the
probabilities of different scenarios. For such policies one has to go back to the
underlying social welfare criteria. This is an additional reason to pay careful
attention to the selection of such criteria on sound ethical principles.

7

Stern, The Stern Reiew § 2A.2 at 49-50 (cited in note 5).
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APPENDIX

In this appendix, we provide a simple illustration of the discount rate
obtained by the various utilitarian criteriaso and by the EDE" in a simple twostate scenario. We assume that in the favorable state the human species spans two
million years, comprising eighty thousand generations (a generation is assumed
to span twenty-five years), and we assume that four thousand generations (one
hundred thousand years) have already lived up to now. The world population is
assumed to be stable from now on, with three billion members per generation
(three generations overlap at any given moment in time). The past population
since year zero is assumed to have grown from an initial number of two
individuals at a rate of 0.3 percent per generation until ten thousand years ago
(year 90,000), with the growth rate then rising to 2.62 percent per generation.
There are two dynasties, one consuming one unit today and the other
consuming five units today. The evolution of consumption over time can hardly
be assumed to be exponential over such a long horizon. Indeed, assuming that
the first generation consumed 0.04 units per capita, 82 the growth rate of per
capita consumption up to now would have been 0.081 percent on average per
generation. This rate seems very small, but would imply that the last generation
in 1.9 million years would consume about 1026 times as much as people now, a
number that is probably much greater than the number of planets in the
universe.83
We will instead assume that consumption is constant, except for the period
1760-2260, in which the growth rate per year is approximately 1.3 percent and
consumption grows by a factor of 625. Inequality remains constant between the
two dynasties. After the growth transition, future generations consume twentyfive times our current consumption level.
In order to introduce risk we also assume that with a 20 percent
probability, consumption will stagnate permanently from now on, and that only
forty thousand generations live (extinction after one million years). This is the
unfavorable state.
We retain 84 the utility function of the following form

80

See text accompanying notes 74-77.

s1

See text accompanying note 69.
If 1 unit is worth $10,000 per annum, 0.04 units is slightly above $1 per day.

82
83

Pieter van Dokkum and Charlie Conroy, A Substantial Populaion of Low-Mass Stars in Luminous
Elptical Gaaies,468 Nature 940, 940-42 (2010) (estimating the number of stars below 1024).

84

See Equation (2) in Section II.
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u(c) -

1

(C1-P

-

e1-p),

(Al)

and let
<p(u(c))

-

(A2)

U(c)1-E

with p = E = 2 and e = 0.02 (0.02 being half of the first generation's
consumption). We consider a policy that is paid for only by the rich dynasty of
the 4,000th generation (the present generation) and benefits every dynasty in
future generations equally. That is, we ask how much a $1 benefit equally shared
between rich and poor in the future is worth, compared to $1 paid by the rich
today.
TABLE Al. DISCOUNT RATE FOR DIFFERENT SOCIAL WELFARE CRITERIA
Discount rate (per annum)

Time horizon
(years)

EDE (equally
distributed
equivalent)

Total or criticallevel utilitarian

Average
utilitarian

50

-3.81%

-3.34%

-3.77%

100

-1.64%

-1.21%

-1.62%

200

-0.76%

-0.49%

-0.75%

500

-0.30%

-0.19%

-0.30%

1000

-0.15%

-0.10%

-0.15%

The main lesson of Table Al is that the difference between the criteria is
far from negligible. It appears that the difference between the EDE and average
utilitarian criteria is smaller than the difference between these two criteria and
total utilitarianism. However, other simulations done by the authors for different
consumption paths show that other patterns are also possible. The fact that the
discount rates are not very different between the utilitarian criteria and the EDE
(which introduces additional inequality aversion via the function <p (.)) is a direct
consequence of adopting a utility function that varies very little between the
consumptions of one to five units, so that the social priority between the rich
and poor dynasties is mostly determined by marginal utility, as in utilitarianism.
The discount rates in Table Al tend to zero in the very long run because
the difference in consumption between the donors (five units) and the worst off
in the worst scenario (one unit) becomes very small in terms of annualgrowth
rate. Observe that a discount rate of -3 percent per annum places a strong
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priority on the future: it means that it is worth sacrificing $4.60 now to transfer
$1 fifty years into the future.
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